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Abstract Because of bacterial resistance, current antibiotic consumption is rein-
forced by past use, and future utility is lower. The purpose of this article is to provide
evidence on habit and addictive behavior toward antibiotics by exploring variations
in the average consumption of antibiotics across 20 Italian regions. Using a balanced
panel data set (2000–2009), we estimate myopic and rational addiction models, in
which antibiotic consumption depends upon demographic and socioeconomic char-
acteristics of the population, the supply of health care in the community, antibiotic
price, and the “capital stock” of endogenous bacterial resistance measured by past
and future consumption. Our empirical evidence shows that past antibiotic consump-
tion stimulates current consumption and is also consistent with the rational addiction
hypothesis. The low price elasticity of antibiotic demand suggests that policy mea-
sures targeted at antibiotic co-payments may not be effective in controlling antibiotic
consumption. There is scope for other policy interventions, such as incentives and
information campaigns targeted at doctors.
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1 Introduction
Antibiotic misuse increases the threat of bacterial resistance, which in turn reduces
antibiotic effectiveness over time (Elbasha 2003; Laxminarayan and Brown 2001). It
has been suggested that efforts to restrict antibiotic use in outpatients have not been
very successful since no central agent, such as a hospital administrator or infection
control committee, can enforce an antibiotic policy (Harbarth and Samore 2005).
Understanding of the dynamics of antibiotic consumption may help shape appropriate
measures of public intervention to optimize the use of antimicrobials. The empirical
literature is lacking in this respect.
Recent theoretical studies on the economics of antibiotics suggest that consumers
make inter-temporal decisions. To some extent, antibiotics are similar to addictive
goods since individuals may develop dependence or experience persistent attitudes
toward consumption. Also, current antibiotic consumption may be affected by past
consumption because of endogenous bacterial resistance. Static empirical models of
antibiotic demand do not consider the process of adjustment toward optimal levels of
antibiotic consumption.
The mechanism of transmission of antimicrobial resistance is described by the basic
SIS epidemiological model, which is used, for instance, in recent theoretical studies by
Herrmann and Gaudet (2009) and Wilen and Msangi (2003). The SIS model assumes
that the population is partitioned into infected individuals and individuals in good
health. Uninfected individuals can become infected through contact with the infected
population and individuals can be infected by a drug-resistant strain or a drug-suscep-
tible strain. The transmission of drug-resistant strains to healthy individuals depends
on the number and the speed of contacts among individuals. Some individuals infected
with a drug-resistant strain naturally recover, but the rate of recovery for those treated
with antibiotics remains unchanged.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic approach to investigate antibiotic use in outpa-
tient care that hypothesizes that antibiotic consumption is affected by antibiotic inef-
ficacy, i.e., the stock of bacterial resistance to antimicrobials. The level of inefficacy
represents a bad that is indirectly measurable by means of past and future antibiotic use.
Individuals may be myopic in the sense that the effect of present antibiotic consump-
tion on future consumption is not taken into account in their consumption choices. In
this case, past consumption is presumed to affect present consumption only through
the reduced level of antibiotic effectiveness. Conversely, patients may be aware of
future implications of antibiotic use in terms of reduced antibiotic effectiveness. The
plausibility of this assumption is also supported by the trust patients place in their
doctors, whose superior knowledge of the implications of antibiotic treatment drives
patients’ decisions. This may imply that addiction to antibiotics is rational. If con-
sumers’ perceived benefits from antibiotic prescriptions outweigh the small uncertain
costs associated with increased resistance (Brown and Layton 1996), rational agents
may not restrain from increasing consumption over time.
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To investigate consumers’ behavior, we explore myopic and rational models of
habit and addiction to antibiotics. This represents the main novelty of our analysis and
provides a significant contribution to the existing empirical literature on antibiotic
consumption. We focus on variations in the average consumption of antibiotics across
20 Italian regions using a balanced panel between 2000 and 2009. Estimations are
carried out by means of suitable approaches for short dynamic panels.
Our findings support the hypothesis of habit to antibiotic consumption and reject
the myopic model in favor of the rational addiction model. Since short- and long-run
price elasticity estimates are found to be relatively low, we suggest that increasing co-
payments may not be a valid instrument to reduce antibiotic consumption and control
bacterial resistance. There is scope for other policy measures based on incentives for
physicians and information campaigns targeting doctors and patients.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of aspects of antibiotic demand and discusses models of habit and addiction to antibi-
otics. In Sect. 3 we derive our empirical model of demand for antibiotics and discuss
the estimation approach. Section 4 presents the results and Sect. 5 concludes.
2 The dynamics of antibiotic consumption
2.1 Physician versus patient
The Italian healthcare system is based upon a national health service (SSN) mainly
financed by general taxation and characterized by universal access to health care for the
entire population and asymmetric decentralization of health care provision to the 20
regions. The regions allocate financial resources to the local health authorities (LHAs)
within their territories. Patients are registered with GP practices within their prov-
ince of residence. Antibiotics are prescribed by general practitioners (GPs) operating
within the LHA and by pediatricians and specialists.
Antibiotic consumption requires a doctor’s consultation, but usually patients do not
pay for visits. Patients directly pay a small fraction of the full cost of drugs (copay-
ment). The copayment—“ticket”—includes both a cost-sharing scheme and a refer-
ence pricing scheme. According to these, patients are required to contribute to the cost
of antibiotics either by a fixed amount per prescription or by a proportional-to-final
price amount, or by paying the difference between the final price and the reference
price. The reference price is set for drugs that contain the same active ingredient,
identical pharmaceutical dosage and package size.
2.2 Information and incentives
Antibiotic treatment cures patients affected by common bacterial infections and sig-
nificantly reduces recovery time.1 Antibiotics also have external benefits since they
are similar to preventive care. In this sense, the use of antibiotics may contribute to
1 A recent survey by the European Commission (2010) indicates that the majority of the Italian population
(51%) thinks that antibiotics are effective against common infections, such as colds or flu, which are not
cured by antibiotics.
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reducing the spread of bacterial infections to other individuals, which increases future
social benefits from consumption.
Although direct monetary costs of antibiotic treatment (copayment) are relatively
low, antibiotic consumption is characterized by non-monetary and external costs. Cur-
rent antibiotic use may increase the stock of bacterial resistance, which in turn reduces
the effectiveness of antibiotics over time (Elbasha 2003).
Although patients appear to be poorly informed about future costs and benefits of
antibiotic consumption, doctors’ advice may recognize the full price of addictive anti-
biotic consumption. The full cost of antibiotic treatment, which includes the monetary
price as well as the future cost of reduced effectiveness due to past consumption, could
then be weighed against the benefits of antibiotic consumption.
2.3 Alternative models of antibiotics demand
2.3.1 Static models
Static models of antibiotic consumption ignore the link between consumers’ prefer-
ences in different time periods. They assume that a change in current consumption
affects consumers’ utility in the current period only and that consumers do not respond
to changes in past consumption. Consequently, consumption in different periods is
fully separable. This implies that individuals instantaneously adjust to the optimal
level of consumption while also taking bacterial resistance into account.
Consider a simple model in which utility depends on the consumption of a compos-
ite good, ct , the consumption of antibiotics, at , and the level of bacterial resistance,
Rt . Individuals maximize the following utility function:
Ut = u(ct , at ; Rt ), (1)
under the usual budget constraint.
Static models of antibiotic demand exploit cross-sectional data. Usually, data on
bacterial resistance are unavailable. Filippini et al. (2006) propose an econometric
model in which antibiotic use across 26 Swiss cantons varies according to the socioeco-
nomic and demographic characteristics of the population, the incidence of infections,
the local supply of health care, and antibiotic price. Findings suggest that antibiotic
consumption is significantly related to per capita income, antibiotic price, the density
of medical pactices, and demographic, cultural, and educational factors. Kern et al.
(2006) investigate variations in antibiotic prescriptions across 23 areas in 16 German
states in relation to age, population density, income, unemployment, and aspects of
local healthcare supply. Regional patterns of use are similar for children and adults,
although lower levels of consumption for children are observed in southern regions.
The study does not find any significant association between antibiotic consumption
and population density, the percentage of elderly people, income, unemployment,
gross domestic product, and aspects of local healthcare supply. Matuz et al. (2005)
explore regional variations in antibiotic consumption in ambulatory care in Hungary.
The authors do not find any significant relationship between antibiotic consumption
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and the average monthly net income or the demographic structure of the population.
Conversely, a significant association is observed between antibiotic consumption and
the proportion of individuals receiving free access to selected medicines from the pub-
lic health system without quantity limits and the proportion of individuals regularly
receiving social assistance. Finally, Filippini et al. (2009) estimate an econometric
model of the demand for antibiotics using data from 240 small areas in Switzer-
land. The results suggest a positive relationship between antibiotic consumption and
income, the proportion of children between 0 and 14 years of age, and the density of
pharmacies and physicians. On the other hand, antibiotic price and the proportion of
individuals over 74 years of age show a significant negative impact on antibiotic use.
To our knowledge, the only study that utilizes panel data and includes bacterial
resistance among explanatory variables is the recent investigation by Masiero et al.
(2010) on socioeconomic determinants of antibiotic use in Europe. The population
income, demographic structure, density of general practitioners, and their remuner-
ation method appear to be significant determinants of antibiotic consumption. The
responsiveness of antibiotic use to changes in bacterial resistance is found to be rel-
atively low, between 0.09 and 0.18. A limitation of this study is that the process of
adjustment toward optimal levels of antibiotic consumption is neglected.
2.3.2 Models of myopic addiction
Recent theoretical studies on the economics of antibiotics assume inter-temporal deci-
sions (Laxminarayan and Weitzman 2002; Herrmann 2010). Although the empirical
literature is replete with studies on endogenous tastes in the consumption of cigarettes
and alcohol (e.g., Chaloupka 1991; Jones 1994; Baltagi and Griffin 2001; Hidayat and
Thabrany 2010), the investigation of the dynamics of antibiotic consumption is lacking.
In a model of addiction to antibiotics as habit formation, greater past consumption
of antibiotics increases the desire for present consumption. This represents the so-
called reinforcement condition required for addiction, which suggests that individuals
who have undergone antibiotic treatment in the past are more likely to consider the use
of antibiotics in the current period.2 However, individuals ignore the future benefits
and costs of their decisions and are, therefore, myopic. The hypothesis of myopic
behavior in the consumption of antibiotics could be plausible for a number of reasons.
Patients and their doctors may not be fully aware of the future harmful consequences
of current antibiotic consumption. This is because limited information is available on
the levels of antimicrobial resistance, and agents may not be able to evaluate correctly
the impact of resistance on future antibiotic efficacy. Patients may not be aware of
studies that demonstrate conclusively that prior use of antibiotics increases a person’s
risk of acquiring a resistance infection (Laxminarayan 2001).
2 This may be explained by some physical or psychological effects which persist over time. It may also
reflect physicians’ attitudes toward antibiotic prescriptions. Under uncertainty on the nature of patients’
infection, antibiotic therapy may appear to have been beneficial even though patients’ relief was not due to
the treatment. General practitioners may prefer antibiotic therapies since they were presumably effective in
the past or patients are not willing to wait for recovery.
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Assume that past antibiotic consumption is a measure of antibiotics inefficacy, i.e.,
the stock of bacterial resistance, Rt . The variation in antibiotic efficacy over time,
Rt/t , depends on the consumption of antibiotics and the depreciation rate of the
stock of bacterial resistance, ρ,—the rate at which bacteria regress to the susceptibility
state in the absence of antibiotic treatment, also called the “fitness cost of resistance”.
The stock of bacterial resistance can then evolve according to the following relation-
ship:3
Rt = (1 − ρ) Rt−1 + at−1. (2)
This stock adjustment condition relates the stock of habit to the consumption of
antibiotics. Although this stock depends on antibiotic consumption, it is redefined to
represent the influence of bacterial resistance.4
2.3.3 Rational addiction and time preferences
The main insights of rational addictive behavior are theoretically derived by Becker and
Murphy (1988). A sizable empirical literature compares myopic and rational models
of addictive behavior (e.g., Luo et al. 2003; Tiezzi 2005).
In the case of antibiotics, rational individuals are aware that higher levels of anti-
biotic consumption decrease future utility, given the amount of future consumption
(tolerance condition for addiction). Rational consumers weigh current benefit from
consumption against the future health consequences in terms of the risk of antibiotic
inefficacy and the future costs of purchasing new antibiotics. For instance, since endog-
enous bacterial resistance reduces antibiotic efficacy over time, individuals know that
more therapies have to be considered before finding the one effective in curing the
infection.5
Following Becker and Murphy (1988), we can extend Eq. 1 to write the lifetime
utility function of rational agents with a constant rate of time preference, δ, as:
∞∑
t=1
δt−1Ut , (3)
where δ = 1/(1 + r) and r is the interest rate.
In Eq. 3, forward-looking agents are assumed to be time consistent. This means
that current preferences regarding future behavior are in accordance with this behav-
ior. The assumption has been challenged by Gruber and Köszegi (2001) who extended
3 This simple relationship assumes that the effects on antibiotic efficacy generated by the consumption of
other agents are negligible or hidden from consumers. However, bacterial resistance generated by other
agents may also represent a constraint. Although bacterial resistance plausibly spreads within regions, i.e.,
it is a local phenomenon, researchers have hypothesized some global effects (Rudholm 2002).
4 See Jones (1999) for an interpretation of stocks of habits in state adjustment models.
5 Throughout the paper, we assume that individuals make decisions on antibiotic consumption following
the advice of their doctors, as suggested above in Sect. 2.2. We hypothesize that doctors are perfect agents
and patients are compliant with the prescribed antibiotic therapy.
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the analysis to time inconsistency. Antibiotic consumption under time-inconsistent
preferences would indicate, for instance, that individuals state that they agree with a
more careful use of antibiotics and are aware of costly implications of bacterial resis-
tance. Nevertheless, they are unable to act in accordance with this view and ignore
these aspects in their future choices of consumption.6
3 Model specification and econometric approach
For our empirical approach, we simplify the dynamic equation 2 and assume that bac-
terial resistance fully depreciates after one period, i.e., ρ = 1. Using (1) and (2), we
can then write the lifetime utility function (3) as:
∞∑
t=1
δt−1u (ct , at , at−1, et ) , (4)
where et represents the impact of unmeasured life-cycle variables on utility.
Following Becker et al. (1994), we can define the maximization constraint as:
a0 = a0 and
∞∑
t=1
δt−1 (ct + Pt at ) = A0, (5)
where Pt is antibiotic co-payment at period t , a0 is the initial condition indicating the
level of antibiotic consumption at period zero, and A0 is the present value of wealth.
The first-order conditions to solve the problem above imply that the marginal util-
ity of current antibiotic consumption plus the discounted marginal effect on the next
period’s utility of current consumption is equal to the marginal utility of wealth multi-
plied by the current co-payment. Furthermore, the marginal utility of wealth equals the
marginal utility of the composite good in each period. Using a quadratic utility func-
tion, the solution of the first-order conditions leads to the following first-difference
equation:
at = θat−1 + δθat+1 + θ1 Pt + θ2et + θ3et+1. (6)
In this equation, current antibiotic consumption is a function of past and future
consumption, co-payment, and unobservable variables. The θ coefficients depend on
the parameters of the quadratic utility function. For further details see Baltagi and
Griffin (2001). A comprehensive discussion on the interpretation and the derivation
of Eq. 6 can be found in Becker et al. (1994).
To empirically investigate the dynamics of antibiotic consumption, we modify the
first-difference equation 6, as in Baltagi and Griffin (2002), and write the following
equation:
6 Two extreme kinds of agents, naive and sophisticated, are of interest. Naive agents attach extra value to
antibiotic consumption in the current period relative to future periods but are unaware of their future inability
to use antibiotics more carefully. Conversely, sophisticated patients realize that they are time-inconsistent.
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ait = β0 + β1ait−1 + β2ait+1 + β3 Pit + β4Yit + β5 P O P1i t + β6 P O P3i t
+β7 D P O Pit + β8 D P Hit + β9 I N Fit + β10 I M Mit + vi t , (7)
where ait is the level of antibiotic use in the i th region (i = 1, . . . , 20) at time t ,
measured in defined daily doses per 1000 inhabitants; Yit is real GDP per capita,
and P O P1i t and P O P3i t denote, respectively, the percentage of the population
below 14 and above 74. D P O Pit is population density, and D P Hit is the density
of physician practices. Finally, I N Fit captures the rate of infectious diseases, I M Mit
denotes the rate of working permits for foreign workers, and νi t is a disturbance
term.
From Eq. 7 one can obtain the discount rate (δ) as the ratio between the estimated
coefficient of at+1 (β2) and the estimated coefficient of at−1 (β1). The coefficient
β1 captures the impact of past consumption on current consumption. Consequently,
a positive and significant coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis that antibiotic
use is a habit or addictive behavior. The coefficient β2 measures the impact of future
consumption on current consumption. A positive and significant coefficient would be
consistent with the hypothesis of rational addiction and would support rejecting the
hypothesis of myopic addiction.
One can easily limit the focus to myopic consumers by combining Eqs. 1 and 2.
Myopic agents maximize current period utility instead of the lifetime utility function
(3), under the assumption that current antibiotic consumption is affected by past con-
sumption as hypothesized by (2). A myopic model of addiction can be derived from
(7) by dropping the lead term at+1:
ait = β0 + β1ait−1 + β2 Pit + β3Yit + β4 P O P1i t + β5 P O P3i t
+β6 D P O Pit + β7 D P Hit + β8 I N Fit + β9 I M Mit + vi t . (8)
For the estimation of myopic and rational models of addiction to antibiotics, we
have a balanced panel data set for the 20 Italians regions. To account for unobserved
heterogeneity, we could use a fixed effects (LSDV) or a random effects (RE) model.
However, the estimation of the dynamic panel data models (7)-(8) using LSDV or RE
estimators is not appropriate. This is because the inclusion of lagged and lead- depen-
dent variables among regressors violates the strict exogeneity assumption. In fact,
lagged and lead variables are correlated with the error term, which leads to biased and
inconsistent estimates of LSDV and RE.7 In the literature, several instrumental vari-
able estimators have been proposed to solve this problem. Anderson and Hsiao (1982)
proposed a simple instrumental variable estimator. Arellano and Bond (1991) as well
as Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed two different estimators based on the general
method of moments (GMM-AB and GMM-BB). A problem with these estimators is
that properties do not hold for small panel data (small N and T ).8
7 For a discussion of this issue and for a presentation of econometric models for panel data see Baltagi
(2001).
8 For a discussion of this issue, see Harris et al. (2008, p. 269).
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Kiviet (1995) suggested an alternative approach to small panel data sets for the
estimation of dynamic models with just a lagged variable, such as model (8), based
on the correction of the bias of the LSDV model.
In a Monte Carlo analysis, Judson and Owen (1999) and Kiviet (1995) showed
that in typical aggregate dynamic panels characterized by T lower than or equal to
20 and N lower or equal to 50, as in our case, the Anderson-Hsiao and the Kiviet-
corrected LSDV (LSDVC) estimators have better properties than the GMM estimator
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Despite having a higher average bias, the
corrected LSDV estimator turns out to be more efficient than the Anderson-Hsiao.
This suggests that the corrected LSDV estimator is an effective approach for small
panels (T ≤ 20), while the Anderson-Hsiao estimator is more appropriate for large
panels, as the efficiency of the latter improves with T .
An alternative method to solve the endogeneity problem is the fixed- effects two-
stage least squares approach (FE2SLS) inspired by the original work of Balestra and
Nerlove (1966). This approach is discussed in detail in Baltagi (2001) and applied
by Baltagi and Griffin (2002). The approach employs the within transformation and
utilizes the exogenous variables and their lags as instruments. Obviously, the effec-
tiveness of the FE2SLS estimator critically depends on the quality of the instruments
adopted.
Our panel includes 20 regions for the period 2000–2009. Given the characteristics
of the panel, we choose the LSDVC and the FE2SLS estimators for our myopic model
of addiction defined by (8).9
For the estimation of the dynamic model in (7), the corrected LSDV estimator is
not completely appropriate. The reason is that this estimator is valid in the presence of
exogenous regressors only. To the extent that one-period forward consumption (ait+1)
is endogenous, as discussed in Becker et al. (1994), the coefficient of this variable is
biased. This potential endogeneity problem, caused by lagged and forward consump-
tion, can be solved by the FE2SLS approach, as suggested by Baltagi and Griffin
(2002). We consider lagged and lead values of price, income, and other covariates
as instruments for past and future consumption. We then estimate Eqs. 7 and 8 using
both the corrected LSDV and the FE2SLS approaches. We are fully aware that the
estimation of (7) using the corrected LSDV estimator could produce biased results.
3.1 Data
The balanced panel data set for the 20 Italian regions was created using several sources.
Data on regional outpatient antibiotic consumption, i.e., group J of the Anatomi-
cal Therapeutic Chemical Classification (ATC) of drugs, were collected from annual
reports prepared by the Italian National Observatory on Drugs Utilization (Osmed).
The per capita consumption is measured by the number of defined daily doses per
9 Spatial aspects of consumption are not considered here. In a preliminary stage of this analysis we estimated
a spatial dynamic model following two approaches: the corrected 2SLS approach suggested by Beenstock
and Felsenstein (2007). However, the results were not encouraging. This could be due to the fact that our
data set is characterized by a low T and a low N.
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1000 inhabitants per day (DI D). A defined daily dose represents the standard dose
necessary for one day of drug treatment in adults and is defined by an independent
scientific committee answering to the WHO Collaborating Center for Drug Statistics
Methodology. The DI D measure can be interpreted as the number of persons (out of
1000) who are taking antibiotics on a given day.
Data on antibiotic consumption in Italy are available for the 10 years between 2000
and 2009. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. The mean level of antibiotic
consumption during the period was 23.70 DI D. Antimicrobials use slightly increased
over time, with a peak in 2009 (25.24) and a minimum in 2000 (22.36). A remarkable
degree of heterogeneity in consumption is observed across the regions. Generally,
regions in central Italy use more antibiotics per capita (25.12 DI D) than regions in
the north (18.53 DI D) and less than southern regions and the islands (28.99 DI D).
As mentioned in Sect. 2.1, antibiotics are included in class A by the Italian National
Health Service (SSN), which means they require a doctor’s prescription and are sup-
plied virtually free of charge, in return for small patient co-payments. Information
on co-payments is obtained from annual reports on pharmaceutical consumption and
expenditure prepared by Osmed. Regional co-payments vary from 0 to 4 Euros with
a national average of 0.87 Euros.
Data on the demographic structure of the population and density, per capita income,
density of general practices, the number of working permits for immigrants, and the
rate of infectious diseases are obtained from the Italian National Institute of Statistics
(Istat). Data on these covariates are available for 9 years, between 2000 and 2008, with
the exception of income and population density.
4 Results
In this section, we discuss the results obtained from the estimations of our models of
habit and addiction to antibiotics. For the myopic model, estimations are carried out
on the modified Eq. 8, while the rational addiction model is directly estimated on (7).
Both models are estimated by means of the corrected LSDV and the FE2SLS esti-
mators discussed above. We summarize our findings in Table 2 for the myopic model
and in Table 3 for the rational addiction model. The estimates are shown together with
p-values of the test statistics and standard errors. The number of observations used in
the FE2SLS regressions is lower than the number of observations used in the LSDVC
regressions, since lead values of explanatory variables are included among the set of
instruments in the FE2SLS approach. First-stage regressions on the instruments yield
significant joint F-tests and exhibit high R2, 0.54 and 0.80, respectively, for the myo-
pic and the rational addiction models. Finally, the p-value of the Sargan test statistics
does not reject the null hypothesis and concludes that the over-identifying restriction
is valid.
In the myopic model, the dynamics of antibiotic use is captured by the coefficient
of the lagged variable of consumption, at−1. This is positive and highly significant in
both the LSDVC and the FE2SLS regressions, which supports the hypothesis of habit
to antibiotic consumption. The coefficient of income is also significant in the FE2SLS
regression, at the 5% significance level. In accordance with the economic theory, we
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Table 2 Parameter estimates of myopic models of habit to antibiotics
Variables LSDVC FE2SLS
Obs. 140 Obs. 120
Coefficients SE p-value Coefficients SE p-value
Constant – – – 14.39705 13.60300 0.290
P −0.217246 0.095916 0.024 −0.065501 0.127598 0.608
Y 0.000193 0.000159 0.224 0.000585 0.000237 0.013
POP1 −0.706939 0.349829 0.043 −0.155507 0.541298 0.774
POP3 −0.606525 0.467679 0.195 −0.137834 0.838389 0.869
DPOP −0.035590 0.027385 0.194 −0.025877 0.036700 0.481
DPH 1.832944 4.422422 0.679 −3.736097 5.937115 0.529
INF −0.000861 0.000851 0.312 −0.001344 0.001046 0.199
IMM 0.342392 0.149850 0.022 −0.367148 0.247223 0.138
at−1 0.492594 0.092653 0.000 0.354114 0.166113 0.033
Notes The instruments used in the F E2SL S regression are Pt , Yt , P O P1t , P O P3t , D P O Pt , D P Ht ,
I N Ft , I M Mt , and their one- and two-period lags and future values. First-stage regressions on the instru-
ments yield significant joint F-tests. Moreover, the p-value of the Sargan-test statistics does not reject the
null hypothesis and concludes that the overidentifying restriction is valid
Table 3 Parameter estimates of rational models of addiction to antibiotics
Variables LSDVC FE2SLS
Obs. 140 Obs. 120
Coefficients SE p-value Coefficients SE p-value
Constant – – – 0.990672 14.05327 0.944
P −0.191576 0.086065 0.026 −0.121166 0.122829 0.324
Y 0.000008 0.000147 0.956 0.000437 0.000232 0.060
POP1 −0.269570 0.324759 0.407 0.400516 0.518027 0.938
POP3 −0.469742 0.426974 0.271 −0.367230 0.797943 0.645
DPOP −0.008220 4.034917 0.738 0.007821 0.037502 0.835
DPH 1.534188 0.170049 0.704 −0.490277 5.775167 0.932
INF −0.001320 0.000781 0.091 −0.002019 0.001029 0.050
IMM 0.206112 0.138807 0.138 −0.434565 0.235284 0.065
at−1 0.474151 0.078549 0.000 0.364383 0.156979 0.020
at+1 0.417266 0.080337 0.000 0.334489 0.141954 0.018
Notes The instruments used in the F E2SL S regression are Pt , Yt , P O P1t , P O P3t , D P O Pt , D P Ht ,
I N Ft , I M Mt , and their one- and two-period lags and future values. First-stage regressions on the instru-
ments yield significant joint F-tests. Moreover, the p-value of the Sargan test statistics does not reject the
null hypothesis and concludes that the over-identifying restriction is valid
find a statistically significant and negative association between antibiotic consumption
and co-payment, at least in the LSDVC estimation, even though the impact is relatively
low.
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Using the coefficient of co-payment, we can calculate the short- and long-run elas-
ticities. Short- and long-run price elasticities (εt and ε∞) evaluated at the means of the
data (a and P) can be calculated using the formulas derived by Becker et al. (1994) in
their Appendix A and applied in Baltagi and Griffin (2001, 2002). For the short-run
elasticity εt = (dat/dPt )(P/a) with dat/dPt = 2β3/[1 − 2β2 + (1 − 4β1β2)0.5], and
for the long-run elasticity ε∞ = (da∞/dP)(P/a) with da∞/dP = β3/(1−β1 −β2).
For the myopic model, we use these formulas assuming that β2 is zero.
Short- and long- run elasticities for myopic consumers are−0.02 and−0.03, respec-
tively. The average long-run elasticity is approximately 1.5 times as large as the short-
run elasticity. Using a natural experiment across Italian regions, Fiorio and Siciliani
(2010) investigate the effect of co-payments on drug prescriptions. They find that an
increase in the co-payment by one Euro reduces the per capita number of prescriptions
by 4% and the per capita public pharmaceutical expenditures by 3.4%.
As for the rational addiction model estimated using (7), we observe that the coeffi-
cients of past and future consumption are significant and positive in both the LSDVC
and the FE2SLS estimations, which rejects the myopic model in favor of the rational
addiction model. The rate of infections is also significant at less than 10% level in
both regressions, while income is only significant in the FE2SLS regression at the
10% significance level.
The coefficients of the population below 14 (P O P1) and above 74 (P O P3) are
generally not significant, with the exception of P O P1 in the myopic LSDVC model.
Negative signs of these coefficients may indicate that regions with a relatively large
proportion of younger and elderly individuals are less likely to use antibiotics, cete-
ris paribus. The literature has suggested an increase in the utilization of healthcare
services as people grow older. However, this relationship finds very weak support in
some empirical studies (see, for instance, Di Matteo 2005) as well as in studies of
antibiotic use. There are some plausible explanations for this. First, individuals in the
labor force may be more prone to use antibiotics because of time pressure. Second,
individuals may be more careful when giving antibiotics to their children because of
perceived risks. A similar consideration applies to elderly individuals.
Following Baltagi and Griffin (2001), we calculated the interest rate as r = (1−δ)/δ,
where δ is the ratio between the estimated coefficient of at+1 and the estimated
coefficient of at−1, as shown by Eq. 6 in Sect. 3. The estimated coefficients of
the lag and lead variables of antibiotic consumption suggest that the discount rate
(δ) ranges from 0.88 in the corrected LSDV estimation to 0.92 in the FE2SLS
approach. Accordingly, these figures indicate that the interest rate (r) varies from
8.7% to 13.6%. Support for the rational addictive behavior is reinforced by the posi-
tive and relatively close values of the interest rate. The magnitude of these figures is not
implausible since the discount factor is lower than one, which gives positive interest
rates.
The coefficient of copayment is significant in the corrected LSDV only, as in the
myopic model. This coefficient could be biased, as explained above. Nevertheless, we
can calculate short- and long-run price elasticities for rational agents using the for-
mulas above. The short-run elasticity is around −0.05, while the long-run elasticity is
about −0.14. Elasticities are relatively low compared to estimated elasticities for ciga-
rettes and alcohol consumption in many empirical studies. In contrast to cigarettes and
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alcohol consumption, antibiotics are generally perceived as being necessary and are
purchased under a doctor’s advice. Moreover, at least in the Italian healthcare system,
consumers directly pay a small proportion of the full price of antibiotics that has been
relatively stable over time. This could imply that consumers are not very sensitive to
price changes.
The possible policy implication of smaller short-run rather that long-run co-pay-
ment elasticities is that there is scope for raising revenues from increasing co-payments
on antibiotics in the short-run. Moreover, these gains are long lived since the long-run
elasticity is also relatively low. However, co-payments on antibiotic use may not rep-
resent an effective instrument to reduce antibiotic consumption and control bacterial
resistance. The low elasticity of demand for antibiotics suggests that policy measures
not targeted at antibiotic co-payments may be more effective in controlling antibiotic
consumption. These measures may include providing incentives and information to
physicians and public campaigns for promoting careful use of antibiotics targeted at
consumers. A recent review of public campaigns in high-income countries (Huttner
et al. 2010) highlights evidence that public campaigns have been successful in reduc-
ing antibiotic consumption, but their effects on bacterial resistance have not yet been
accurately assessed.
5 Conclusions
An improved understanding of the dynamics of antibiotic consumption may con-
tribute to the shaping of appropriate measures of public interventions to optimize
the use of antimicrobials. Recent theoretical studies on the economics of antibiotics
suggest that consumers make inter-temporal decisions. In this paper, we proposed
a dynamic approach to investigate antibiotic use in outpatient care, which hypothe-
sizes that antibiotic consumption is affected by antibiotic inefficacy, i.e., the stock of
bacterial resistance to antimicrobials.
We explored myopic and rational models of habit and addiction to antibiotics, which
represents the main novelty of our analysis and provides a significant contribution to
the existing empirical literature on antibiotic consumption. We found positive and sig-
nificant coefficients of past and future consumption, which supports the hypothesis of
habit to antibiotic consumption and rejects the myopic model in favor of the rational
addiction model. Evidence of rational addiction is reinforced by positive values of the
interest rate.
As for policy implications, our results indicate that short- and long-run price elas-
ticity estimates are relatively low, at least for small co-payments such as those in Italy.
Therefore, increasing co-payments may not affect antibiotic consumption appreciably.
Information provided by public campaigns about the future negative effects of antibi-
otic misuse targeting doctors and patients may, however, have a significant impact on
the behavior of forward-looking consumers.
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